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 1 
The Procedure of Demosthenes’ Against Leptines:  
How to Repeal (and Replace) an Existing Law1 
 
1. Introduction: the procedure of the Against Leptines 
 
 In 355/4 an Athenian named Apsephion brought a public action to repeal an 
inexpedient law (γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι).2 The prosecution was aimed 
at a law enacted by Leptines in 356/5, which abolished all exemptions from liturgies 
except those granted to the tyrannicides.3 The charge was against the law, not against 
Leptines, who was no longer subject to prosecution because more than a year had 
elapsed since his law was enacted (§144). At the trial, Demosthenes delivered his 
speech as a supporting speaker (synegoros). 4  Phormion also participated on 
Apsephion’s side as a synegoros. Before the case came to trial, Phormion, Apsephion 
and Demosthenes proposed a law to replace Leptines’ law. This replacement law 
proposed to institute a public action (γραφή) that could be brought against anyone 
who had received an honour in the past and was no longer considered worthy to retain 
it.  As with all public actions, the decision about this issue would be made by a panel 
of judges in a lawcourt.5 In his speech at the trial, Demosthenes states that his ultimate 
                                                
1 I want to thank Edward Harris for his generous help and advice on this article, and the readers of JHS 
for useful feedback and suggestions. 
2 This is clearly indicated by the use of οὐκ ἐπιτήδειον associated with Leptines’ law, cf. §§83, 88, 95, 
153. Cf. also §1: εἵνεκα τοῦ νομίζειν συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει λελύσθαι τὸν νόμον. 
3 Demosthenes throughout the speech seems to imply that only honorary exemptions were abolished, 
yet at Dem. 20.29-50 he gives the impression that the law cancelled also exemptions from custom 
duties and commercial taxes (cfr. MacDowell [2004] and Canevaro-Rutter [2015] 13-18). The citations 
of Leptines’ law make clear that all exemptions from liturgies were involved. 
4 Cf. Canevaro (2009) 117-19 and passim, and Kremmydas (2012) 2-3, 33-8 for the date, the actors and 
the context of the trial. 
5 At §§88, 97-8 and 137 Demosthenes does not restrict the range of application of this law to 
exemptions, so it is possible that it was intended to be available to rescind any honour, not only 
ἀτέλεια. Unlike the γραφὴ παρανόμων, which was brought against the proposer of the honours, this 
γραφή was meant to be brought, even decades after the grant, directly against the honorand (or his 
heirs), who would be assessed for their merits and worth (pace Kremmydas [2012] 344). In addition to 
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goal is to enact this replacement law and that the public action against Leptines’ law 
is the correct way to achieve this goal.  
 Demosthenes’ account of the procedure followed by himself, Apsephion, and 
Phormion has given rise to considerable debate among scholars.6 These debates focus 
on two main issues. The first issue is: how did the public procedure against 
inexpedient laws fit within the nomothesia procedure to enact new laws? The second 
issue is: what was the correct procedure to enact a new law, and how did 
Demosthenes expect it to be enacted in this case? These issues are of central 
importance for our understanding of Athenian law and legal procedure because they 
help us to understand how the Athenians achieved consistency in their legislation, 
which was a key feature of the rule of law, an essential part of democratic ideology.7 
One of the main complications is the contradiction between Demosthenes’ 
account of the procedure followed against Leptines’ law and a document inserted into 
the text of Demosthenes’ Against Timocrates (24.33). According to Demosthenes 
(e.g. §88) the ultimate aim of Apsephion’s public action was not just to repeal 
Leptines’ law, but also to enact new legislation (i.e. the replacement law). On the 
other hand, Apsephion had clearly brought a public action against an inexpedient law 
when prosecuting Leptines’ law. Like all public actions, the case would have come 
before a court. Yet we know that after 403 all nomoi had to be enacted by the 
                                                                                                                                      
rescinding the honour, the judges could also vote additional punishments for the honorand, proposed by 
the accusers (§164). 
6 E.g. Kahrstedt (1938), Atkinson (1939), Wolff (1970/2), MacDowell (1975), Hansen (1979-80), 
Calabi Limentani (1982), Rhodes (1984), Hansen (1985), Piérart (2000), Rhodes (2003), Kremmydas 
(2012) 24-33, 341-66. Cf. Canevaro (2015) for the development of these procedures. The main sources, 
apart from this speech, are Dem. 24.18-35 and Aeschin. 3.38-40. The fourth-century laws preserved 
epigraphically are, in chronological order, SEG 26.72; Stroud (1998); Agora Excavations, inv. no. I 
7495 (unpublished); IG II2 140; IG II2 244; IG II3 320; IG II3 447; IG II3 445. Cf. also Clinton (2005–8) 
no. 138; (2008) 116; SEG 52.104. 
7 On the democratic ideology of the rule of law see Harris (2013) 3-20. On the Athenians striving for 
consistency among their laws see Sickinger (2008), Wohl (2010) 292-301, Canevaro (2013b) 158-60 
and (forthcoming).  
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nomothetai.8 One could not enact one law by bringing a public action in a court 
against another law.9 Most scholars have dissociated the action against inexpedient 
laws from nomothesia and assumed that its sole function was to repeal laws.10 It was 
not used to repeal contradictory laws when someone proposed a new law.  
This view of the function of the public action against inexpedient laws 
depends on information found in the inserted document at Dem. 24.33. This document 
states: ‘It is prohibited to repeal any existing law except at a session of nomothetai. 
And then, any Athenian who wishes to repeal a law, shall propose a new law to 
replace the one repealed’. This provision seems to prove beyond a doubt that in order 
to repeal an existing law one had to go before the nomothetai and that to remove 
contradictory laws as part of nomothesia one did not bring a public action against an 
inexpedient law. This has important implications: if this view is correct, it would 
mean that Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes could not have enacted their new 
law by using the public action against an inexpedient law and they could also not have 
used this action to repeal Leptines’ law. On the contrary, they should have gone 
before the nomothetai to repeal Leptines’ law. This would in turn imply that 
Demosthenes’ statements about the appropriate procedures for enacting new laws are 
incorrect11 and that the procedure Apsephion followed in bringing the case against 
Leptines’ law was highly irregular.12 
                                                
8 Cf. Harrison (1955) 26; Hansen (1991) 164; Kremmydas (2012) 24; Canevaro (2015) for the 
institution of the new nomothesia in 403. Cf. also Hansen (1978) and (1979), who shows that laws 
were consistently enacted by the nomothetai throughout the fourth century. 
9 Cf. Canevaro (2013b) 143-50 and (2013a) 80-93. 
10 Cf. e.g. Wolff (1970/2) 28-44; Hansen (1979-80) 89-91; Calabi Limentani (1981) 361; Rhodes 
(1984) 58; Kremmydas (2012) 88-9. Contra Kahrstedt (1938) 23-5 and Atkinson (1939) 133-4. 
11 E.g. when at §89 he states that ‘on the one hand, if someone thinks that any of the existing laws is 
not good, he can bring a public action against it; on the other hand he proposes a replacement law’. 
12 This conclusion is inescapable unless one postulates that the procedure here described is prescribed 
by an old law in disuse. This was argued by MacDowell (1975) 65, 73 and passim, but his 
interpretation has been shown by Hansen (1979-80) 92-5 and Rhodes (1984) 56 to be untenable (see 
below pp. 000-00). 
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Two main solutions have been proposed to solve these problems.13   
1) The law proposed by Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes to replace 
Leptines’ law was nothing more than a ruse designed to deceive the judges and 
convince them that by repealing Leptines’ law they would automatically enact the 
replacement law.14 This was not true, and Dem. 24.17-19, 24-6, and the epigraphical 
evidence make it clear that laws in the fourth century BCE had to be enacted by the 
nomothetai.15  Demosthenes’ aim was simply to repeal Leptines’ law, and none of the 
accusers had any intention of enacting any new law. If this view is correct, 
Demosthenes is lying when he describes the procedures he is following. Wolff was 
the first one to propose this solution, which has been endorsed by Rhodes, 
Kremmydas and Hansen. Hansen however later retracted his endorsement.16 
2) After retracting his endorsement of Wolff’s view, Hansen proposed a new 
solution.17  Because the case was unusual (more than one year had passed since the 
approval of Leptines’ law, the original accuser, Bathippus, was dead, and the law had 
therefore been formally enacted), the thesmothetai devised an ad hoc procedure that 
combined features of the nomothesia procedure with others from the public action 
against inexpedient laws. On the one hand, the thesmothetai took the election of 
advocates (syndikoi or synegoroi; Dem. 24.36, 20.146) and the proposal of a new law 
from the nomothesia procedure. On the other, they took the trial in court from the 
public action against inexpedient laws. Instead of having the new law enacted by the 
nomothetai (as in the nomothesia procedure), it would be enacted by the court upon 
                                                
13 I do not deal here in detail with the reconstructions of Hansen (1979-80) and Calabi Limentani 
(1981), as these have been respectively retracted and convincingly refuted by Hansen (1985). 
14 Wolff (1970/2) 36, followed by Hansen (1979-80) 89-90, Rhodes (1984) 58, Kremmydas (2012) 
342-3 and passim. 
15 Cf. Canevaro (2013a) 143-50 and (2013b) 80-93 and Hansen (1978) and (1979). 
16 In fact Leptines claimed that Apsephion, Demosthenes and Phormion had no intention to get the new 
law enacted (cf. §§98-9). 
17 Hansen (1985) 350-1. 
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the repeal of Leptines’ law.  
Hansen’s solution collides with several objections. First, it gives the 
thesmothetai the power to create new procedures similar to that of a Roman praetor,18 
yet the sources show that they could not create new procedures.19 The thesmothetai 
had only the power to receive charges and to check that the defendant’s offence and 
the relevant procedure were actionable on the basis of a written statute, and that the 
accuser had framed his charges in accordance with the key words of the relevant 
statute. If a magistrate were to accept a charge that did not follow one of the 
procedures prescribed in the laws of the city, he would be subject to prosecution at his 
euthynai ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 48.4).20 Second, as we will see in Section 3, Demosthenes 
never states that the new law would automatically be enacted if the court voted to 
repeal Leptines’ law.  
This is an opportune moment to revisit these issues: the recent publication of 
Kremmydas’ commentary on Demosthenes’ Against Leptines and of my own study of 
nomothesia and of the relevant documents fully justify a reconsideration of the 
topic.21 In particular, I have shown that the documents inserted into the text at Dem. 
24.20-3 and 33, which have been used by scholars as evidence for reconstructing the 
key features of the nomothesia procedure, are unreliable forgeries.22 I have also shown 
that Demosthenes’ own statements about nomothesia in Against Leptines and Against 
Timocrates are generally consistent with each other and are confirmed by the 
evidence of inscriptions.  
                                                
18 On the praetor’s edict and discretionality in creating and modifying actiones cf. e.g. Watson (1970), 
(1995) 74-82; Brennan (2000) vol. 1, 125-35. 
19 The law discussed at Andoc. 1.86 states that magistrates could not make use of unwritten laws. 
20 Cf. Thür (2008) 70-1 and Harris (2013) 117-18. 
21 Kremmydas (2012); Canevaro (2013a) 84-104 and (2013b). 
22 Canevaro (2013b), (2013a) 80-104. 
 6 
I summarise here the main steps in the nomothesia procedure following my 
recent reconstruction: 1) in order to introduce a new law, a preliminary vote in the 
Assembly, at any point of the year, had to be held that would allow new laws to be 
proposed (Dem. 24.25; IG II3 320 = SEG 12.87, IG II2 140); this vote, as all votes in 
the Assembly, had to be preceded by a probouleuma of the Council; 2) once new 
proposals had been authorized by the Assembly, all new proposals had to be posted in 
front of the monument of the Eponymous Heroes (Dem. 24.25; 20.94), so that 
anybody could see them; 3) the bills had to be read out by the secretary in each 
Assembly until the appointment of the nomothetai (Dem. 20.94); 4) in the third 
Assembly after the preliminary vote, on the basis of the bills presented, the people 
had to discuss the appointment of nomothetai and pass a decree of appointment (Dem. 
24.25; 20.92); 5) opposing laws had to be repealed before the new laws could be 
enacted by the nomothetai (Dem. 24.32, 34–5; Dem. 20.93); 6) presumably at the 
same meeting of the Assembly that appointed the nomothetai expert synegoroi were 
elected to defend those laws whose repeal was necessary for enacting the new laws 
(Dem. 24.36; 20.146); 7) if the proposer of a new law failed to abide by any of these 
provisions, anyone could prosecute him on a charge of enacting an inexpedient law 
(Dem. 24.32), and if the case was heard within a year from the enactment of the law, 
the punishment could be anything the court decides, from a small fine to atimia or 
death. 
In my previous essays,23 I did not however examine how opposing laws were 
to be repealed in step 5 of the procedure. This issue is key for our understanding of 
the procedure followed by Apsephion in bringing his public action against Leptines’ 
law.  
                                                
23 Canevaro (2013b) and (2015). 
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This article will therefore attempt to shed light on the nature of the procedures 
followed in the case Against Leptines, and on how they work in the wider context of 
fourth-century nomothesia. Section 2 will examine the statements of Dem. 24.32 and 
34 and compare them with those of Dem. 20.88-89 and 93-4. It will explore what was 
the correct procedure for repealing contradictory laws in the nomothesia process and 
the ways of using the public action against inexpedient laws. In particular, this section 
will show how this action was used in one way in the Against Timocrates and in 
another way in the Against Leptines. Section 3 studies how the new law of 
Apsephion, Phormio and Demosthenes was to be enacted.  
 
2. How does one repeal a contradictory law? The purposes of the γραφὴ νόμον 
μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι 
 
Previous reconstructions of the procedure followed in the Against Leptines all assume 
that the information provided by the document found at Dem. 24.33 is reliable. They 
are therefore based on the principle that according to the laws on nomothesia 
established laws were (and could be) repealed only by the nomothetai. This 
contradicts the account of the procedure against Leptines’ law followed by 
Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes. This document is however an unreliable 
forgery.24  
If one disregards the information of the document at Dem. 24.33 and looks 
instead at Diodorus’ words before and after the law is read out (Dem. 24.32 and 34), 
one finds that nothing there contradicts Dem. 20.88-89: ‘[Timocrates] also committed 
another crime, which was to introduce his proposal in violation of all the established 
                                                
24 Canevaro (2013b) 156-8, (2013a) 102-4. 
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laws. You will clearly understand this in a minute. Take and read for me first this law 
here, which explicitly forbids the enactment of any law contrary to the existing laws, 
and if someone enacts it, provides for a public action against him. Read it. […] You 
have heard the law. […] It prohibits proposing a law contrary to the existing ones 
unless one rescinds the one already in effect’ (trans. Harris). Diodorus simply states 
that before enacting a new law (with the nomothetai) one has to repeal any 
contradictory laws, but does not explain how and where these contradictory laws must 
be repealed. This detail must have been contained in the law about nomothesia, but 
because it is irrelevant in the context of the Against Timocrates,25 the orator does not 
mention it in his summary. The account of Dem. 24.32-4 (excluding the document) 
therefore does not clash that of Dem. 20.88-9.  
There is moreover no evidence elsewhere that existing laws had to be repealed 
by the nomothetai.26 One passage that seems to envision this possibility may in fact 
support the opposite view and suggest that the nomothetai were not usually in charge 
of repealing laws. Demosthenes in the Third Olynthiac (3.10) addresses the Athenians 
in the Assembly with the following words: ‘Do not be amazed, men of Athens, if I 
say something that most of you will find unexpected. You should appoint lawmakers. 
Use these lawmakers not to pass a law – you have enough of them – but to repeal 
those laws that are presently harming your interests’ (trans. Trevett). He expects that 
                                                
25 Timocrates had not repealed the contradictory laws, and Diodorus was not enacting any new law. 
26 We have evidence for only six γραφαὶ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι: Dem. 20; 24; two examples at 
24.138; Aeschin. 1.34; Lys. fr. 86-7. Hansen (1974) 45-6 shows that Dem. 18.102-5 is a case of γραφὴ 
παρανόμων, pace Wolff (1970/2) 30 and 39 n. 102; cf. also Canevaro (2013a) 267-71. In none of 
these references is there any claim that laws must be repealed by the nomothetai. The procedure 
described at Aeschin. 3.38-40 does not involve strictly speaking the repealing of a legitimately enacted 
law by the nomothetai. The nomothetai must rather choose between two existing contradictory laws 
brought to their attention by the thesmothetai which one should be retained. Because the nomothesia 
procedure should prevent a law from being enacted if it contradicts an existing one (cf. Canevaro 
forthcoming), when the thesmosthetai find two contradictory laws, this means that somewhere along 
the line an irregularity has occurred, and one of them is illegitimate. The nomothetai are tasked with 
deciding which one is legitimate. It is possible moreover that this procedure may be an innovation later 
than Dem. 20 (cf. Kremmydas [2012] 28-32). 
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the Athenians will be surprised (μὴ […] θαυμάσητε) to hear that he advises 
summoning the nomothetai not to enact a new law (μὴ θῆσθε νόμον μηδένα), but to 
repeal some of the existing laws. This suggests that the normal responsibility of the 
nomothetai was enacting new laws,27 and it was unusual that they may repeal one.28 
One may argue that what is paradoxical here is not to have a law repealed by the 
nomothetai but rather, in accordance with the document at Dem. 24.33, to have a law 
repealed without passing an alternative law. Yet the remark εἰσὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἱκανοί 
after the exhortation ἐν δὲ τούτοις τοῖς νομοθέταις μὴ θῆσθε νόμον μηδένα 
(which is what is supposed to be παράδοξον) suggests that the result of using the 
nomothetai the normal way would be to increase the number of laws, which is to be 
avoided because there is enough of them (Dem. 24.142 and 20.91-2 also lament that 
there are too many laws). If the new laws that Demosthenes exhorts the Athenians not 
to enact were only replacement laws, then they would not add to the number of 
Athenian laws, which would remain the same, and therefore there would be no need 
to remark εἰσὶ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἱκανοί. This expression makes better sense if we understand 
it to mean that the normal role of the nomothetai is that of enacting new laws and not 
that of repealing existing ones. 
Because the document at Dem. 24.33 is not reliable, there is no reason to 
reject out of hand the account of the procedure followed to repeal Leptines’ law given 
in the Against Leptines, which puts the judges of a lawcourt in charge of repealing 
contradictory laws. We should therefore pay careful attention to the statements about 
the legal procedure followed to repeal Leptines’ law, in particular §§89-90 and 93-94 
(as well as §96, Dem. 24.32-4 and 3.10). These passages make clear that the public 
                                                
27 This is consistent with what we learn at Dem. 24.24-32, cf. Canevaro (2013b) 141-2, 143-50 and 
Canevaro (2013a) 80-93. 
28 This is further evidence against the authenticity of the document at Dem. 24.33, which supplements 
Canevaro (2013b) 156-8 and (2013a) 102-4. 
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action against inexpedient laws could be used in two ways: 1) to repeal contradictory 
laws before enacting a new one, as part of the nomothesia procedure (as in Dem. 20); 
2) to repeal a law (and punish its proposer) that had not been enacted following the 
proper procedures or which contradicted existing laws, without enacting any new law 
(as in Dem. 24). 
 
2.1 Dem. 20. 89-90 
  
At §88 Demosthenes contrasts Leptines’ law with the proposal that he and his 
associates have made, which allows the Athenians to revoke awards granted to those 
who no longer deserve them and those who have deserved their awards to keep them. 
Demosthenes then asserts that he and his associates have followed all the correct 
procedures (§89). He states that there is nothing strange or new in the way they are 
bringing a charge against Leptines’ law and proposing a replacement law (καὶ 
τούτων πάντων οὐδὲν ἔσtιν ἡμέτερον καινὸν εὕρημα). Demosthenes mentions 
that these very procedures have not been followed by Leptines, and this charge is 
repeated at §94: Leptines has failed to repeal a contradictory law before enacting his. 
Even though Demosthenes charges Leptines with procedural violations when enacting 
his law, it is clear from both passages that the main point of his argument in this 
passage is to show that the procedure followed by the accusers is correct.29 
Demosthenes claims that the procedure through which they are legislating is in 
accordance with an ‘old law’ (ὁ παλαιός [...] νόμος οὕτω κελεύει νομοθετεῖν). The 
                                                
29 The same focus is stressed at §93: ἡμεῖς δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντα, καὶ παρεισφέρομεν 
πολλῷ καὶ κρείττω καὶ δικαιότερον τοῦ τούτου νόμον. γνώσεσθε δ᾽ ἀκούοντες. Note also that 
Leptines was not personally liable (§144), and therefore his procedural violations are tangential to the 
main point of this section. On the other hand, Demosthenes states explicitly that Leptines had attacked 
himself, Apsephion and Phormion at the anakrisis, arguing that the procedure followed was incorrect 
and the replacement law a ruse (§§99-100). 
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use of the adjective παλαιός, together with the description at §91 of new and 
shameful legislative practices, led MacDowell to believe that the procedure followed 
by Apsephion was set forth in an old law passed in 403/2, which was no longer in 
effect.30 According to MacDowell, Leptines enacted his law by following a new 
legislative procedure enacted around 370, which he believed Demosthenes discusses 
with disapproval at §91-2.  
There are three objections to MacDowell’s view. First, at §§91-92 
Demosthenes is not describing new legislative procedures that replaced old ones, but 
the abuse of the standard legislative procedures by contemporary politicians. The 
language used in the passage strongly suggests that the present situation in which 
‘The laws do not differ one iota from decrees, and the laws to be followed when 
passing decrees are more recent than the actual decrees themselves’ (trans. Harris) has 
resulted not from new laws but from the schemes of powerful men (§91: 
κατεσκεύασαν). Second, the official who received the written indictment could not 
have accepted charges based on a statute that had been repealed: he would have run 
the risk of being attacked at his euthynai.31  
Third, the law that Demosthenes calls ‘old’ at §89 is simply a summary of the 
procedures for nomothesia described at §§93-5 and at Dem. 24.18-19, 24-7, 28-32, 
34-6.32 We will discuss Dem. 20.93-95 in Section 2.2. The law on nomothesia  is 
described as ‘old’ (παλαιός) not because it has been repealed and is no longer in 
effect, but rather to confer more authority on it. In the next paragraph it is also 
attributed to Solon, despite the fact that it was probably enacted in the aftermath of 
                                                
30 MacDowell (1975) 65, 73 and passim; cf. also MacDowell (2009) 156-66. 
31 Cf. Thür (2008) 70-1 and Harris (2013) 117-18. 
32 Cf. Hansen (1979-80) 88-95, Rhodes (1984) 56, Canevaro (2013b) 241, (forthcoming). 
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the restoration of democracy in 403/2.33 That the point of mentioning the antiquity of 
a law is to stress its authority is made even clearer by the words of Demosthenes at 
24.24, which also refer to the law on nomothesia: ‘All these laws have already been in 
effect for a long time, men of the court, and have often proved themselves beneficial 
for you.’34 And moreover παλαιός is used elsewhere in the Against Leptines to 
enhance the authority of laws that Demosthenes mentions explicity as valid and in 
effect (§§18, 28 e 153).35 
The παλαιός νόμος therefore is simply the current law on nomothesia,36 the 
one Demosthenes claims that he, Apsephion and Phormion are following. In 
Demosthenes’ words at §89 the correct method of legislation this law prescribed 
(οὕτω κελεύει νομοθετεῖν) is composed of two separate parts, γράφεσθαι (bringing 
a public charge) and proposing a replacement law, two different actions that are 
connected by the particles μέν... δὲ. The first part, γράφεσθαι, does not appear to be 
compulsory whenever one wants to enact a new law. It is in fact qualified by the 
protasis of a future more vivid conditional clause – ‘if someone thinks that any of the 
existing laws is not good’ (ἄν τίς τινα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν 
ἡγῆται) – which applies, from a syntactical point of view, only to γράφεσθαι μέν. 
Bringing a public action is therefore necessary only if one believes that one of the 
                                                
33 Cf. Canevaro-Harris (2012) 110-16. On the action of the late fifth-century nomothetai cf. Harrison 
(1955) 26; Hansen (1991) 164; Kremmydas (2012) 24; Canevaro (2015). On the attribution of laws to 
Solon and its meaning cf. Hansen (1989), Thomas (1994), Johnstone (1999) 25-33, Canevaro 
(forthcoming). 
34 Cf. also Antiph. 5.14 = 6.2, and Canevaro (forthcoming b). 
35 Cf. Rhodes (1984) 57. 
36 Hansen (1979-80) 88-95 argues (following Schöll [1886]) that this law, summarized more in detail at 
§§93-5, is that quoted at Dem. 24.33 (MacDowell named it “Repeal Law”). Yet the document at Dem. 
24.33 is a forgery. Moreover its provisions do not completely match all those of the παλαιός νόμος 
(which shares some also with the law summarized at Dem. 24.24-5). The παλαιός νόμος is more 
likely to correspond to the rules of nomothesia in their entirety, as they are described at Dem. 24.18-36 
(cf. Rhodes [1984] 56-7; Canevaro [2013b] 141-2, 143-50 and Canevaro [2013a] 80-93). 
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existing laws are not good, and not in order to propose any new law.37 In fact, the 
protasis ἄν τίς τινα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν ἡγῆται must refer to 
the rule that when one proposed a new law, one needed first of all to repeal any 
contradictory laws (cf. Dem. 24.32-4 and §93).38 The middle form γράφεσθαι (cf. 
also §96 πρὶν τοῦτον ἔλυσε γραψάμενος) must refer to bringing a public action, a 
γραφή. This is the sense of the verb in legal language. MacDowell wished to 
translate the infinitive as ‘getting a law put down for formal consideration of its 
repeal’,39 yet here and at §96 the verb γράφεσθαι clearly refers to the current action 
brought by Apsephion, an action against an inexpedient law (cf. §94). 
Demosthenes clearly states that the correct venue for repealing contradictory 
laws before enacting a new one is a lawcourt, and that this is done through a public 
action against inexpedient laws (pace the document at Dem. 24.33).40 The second 
prescription mentioned at §89 of the law on nomothesia (ὁ παλαιός [...] νόμος οὕτω 
κελεύει νομοθετεῖν), marked by δὲ, is παρεισφέρειν δ᾽ αὐτὸν ἄλλον (‘to present a 
replacement law’). The second part of the procedure aims to enact a new law because 
the existing law on the subject is not good: this is taken as a given because it  was the 
case with Leptines’ law. So the summary of the law on nomothesia applies to the 
present case brought by Apsephion. In fact, in many cases new laws were probably 
enacted without repealing any existing law (this is what both Leptines and Timocrates 
apparently did, cf. §§95-7 and Dem. 24.32-64). This was not in itself irregular, as 
long as no contradictory laws existed, because γράφεσθαι, as we have seen, was 
compulsory only when an existing law contradicted the new bill.  
At §89 therefore Demosthenes provides an account of the rules of nomothesia 
                                                
37 Pace Hansen (1985) 346-52 and Rhodes (1984) 57 who read these words (and Dem. 24.33) as 
describing a procedure which allows new legislation only when one replaces old laws. 
38 Cf. Canevaro (2013a) 91-4 and (2013b) 147-50, and (forthcoming) for the rationale of this norm. 
39 MacDowell (1975) 64. 
40 Kahrstedt (1938) and Atkinson (1939) understand this clearly. 
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that contemplates a further use of the public action against inexpedient laws. Dem. 
24.32-4 (excluding the document) informs us that this procedure could be used 
against the proposer of a law (either during its enactment or afterwards), on the 
grounds that he had failed to repeal contradictory laws or to follow the correct 
procedures. Here (at §89) the public action against an inexpedient law can be used to 
repeal contradictory laws in order to enact a new law (the Assembly elected σύνδικοι 
of the ‘contradictory’ laws, cf. §146, Dem. 24.36). The public action is therefore an 
integral part of the procedure of nomothesia itself. Scholars, mainly on the basis of 
Dem. 24.33, have doubted Demosthenes’ words, and claimed that he is lying and 
trying to convince the judges that they are in fact nomothetai. It is important therefore 
to compare his account here with what he says right after the law on nomothesia is 
read out by the clerk, at §§93-4. 
 
2.2 Dem. 20.93-4 
 
Demosthenes makes it very clear at §92 that the reason why he is asking the clerk to 
read out the law on nomothesia is to confirm the argument made at §§89-92: 
Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes have followed all the correct procedures (‘so 
that I may not rely on mere assertion, but show the actual law that I am 
discussing…’).41 The summary of the law should therefore be read in the light of what 
Demosthenes states at §§89-90. The orator asks the clerk to read out the law on 
nomothesia with the words λαβέ μοι τὸν νόμον καθ᾽ ὃν ἦσαν οἱ πρότερον 
νομοθέται. The expression οἱ πρότερον νομοθέται is parallel to the description of 
the law as a παλαιός νόμος at §89, and coherent with the description at §§90-2 of 
                                                
41 Pace Kremmydas (2012) 350-1, who claims that this passage has a different emphasis from §§89-92. 
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two imaginary times, one when the laws were respected, and one when they are 
ignored.42 The law read out and summarized at §§93-4 is therefore the same law 
discussed at §89, and this is confirmed at §93, where the law is once again ascribed to 
Solon, as it had been at §90. It is also the same law discussed at Dem. 24.18-35.43 
The account of the provisions of this law opens with the words ‘You see the 
excellent method that Solon provides for enacting laws’ (ὁ Σόλων τοὺς νόμους ὡς 
καλῶς κελεύει τιθέναι), which parallel οὕτω κελεύει νομοθετεῖν of §89. The 
provisions which are relevant to the current case are: πρῶτον μὲν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ἐν τοῖς 
ὀμωμοκόσιν, παρ᾽ οἷσπερ καὶ τἄλλα κυροῦται, ἔπειτα λύοντα τοὺς ἐναντίους. 
The correct procedures imply an assessment by the ὀμωμοκότες and the repealing of 
contradictory laws. ἐν τοῖς ὀμωμοκόσιν refers to those that have sworn the Judicial 
Oath at the beginning of the year and can therefore act as judges in the lawcourts.44 
The most obvious interpretation of this expression is therefore that ‘first’ (πρῶτον 
μὲν) the procedure required a step before the judges in a lawcourt. Scholars have 
however normally subscribed to a different interepretation: this would be a reference 
to the nomothetai, who according to the document of Dem. 24.20-3 were selected 
among those that had sworn the Judicial Oath.45 Demosthenes would therefore be 
mentioning the Oath in order to deceive the judges about their identity and 
                                                
42 Cf. Canevaro (forthcoming) for an analysis of this narrative. It is however unlikely that οἱ πρότερον 
νομοθέται could be the nomothetai in charge of enacting laws, those mentioned in the motion and 
enactment clauses of fourth-century nomoi (e.g. IG II2 244 l. 6: δεδόχθαι τοῖς νομοθέταις). They are 
instead opposed to the politicians described at §91, who ignore the correct rules and procedures. They 
must therefore be the proposers of new laws, who followed the correct procedures. νομοθέτης is in 
fact used in literary sources and inscriptions both for those that assessed and enacted new laws, and for 
those that proposed them (cf. e.g. Dem. 24.103, 113, 152; IOrop 297 = IG II3 348 with Lambert [2004] 
106 and 109 n. 84). 
43 Cf. Canevaro (2013b) 143-50. 
44 Cf. e.g. Boegehold (1995) 186-7 for the practical arrangements of the Judicial Oath; Harris (2013) 
101-37 for its provisions and its importance. The document at Dem. 24.149-51 is unreliable, cf. 
Canevaro (2013a) 173-80 (Sommerstein-Bayliss [2013] 70-80 accept that it is not a transcription of the 
oath at one time, and that it contains unreliable features, but would like to salvage some more clauses). 
45 E.g. MacDowell (1975) 62-74; Hansen (1979-80) 88-95; Rhodes (1984) 55-60; Rhodes (1987) 19; 
Hansen (1985) 363-5, 371; Rhodes (2003) 124-5; Kremmydas (2012) 16-31 and 350-1. 
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prerogatives, and convince them that they are nomothetai. The document at Dem. 
24.20-3 is however a later forgery.46 The information it provides is unreliable, and 
could in fact derive from this very mention of the ὀμωμοκότες. And moreover it is 
important to notice that ὀμωμοκότες is used again in this very speech at §118, and 
refers unequivocally to the judges, and that the nomothetai are never mentioned at 
§§93-4. It is therefore important to pay close attention to Demosthenes’ words at §93 
in the context of the argument developed from §89, without pre-judging the issue 
based on the document at Dem. 24.20-3. 
The main issue with the expression πρῶτον μὲν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ἐν τοῖς 
ὀμωμοκόσιν, παρ᾽ οἷσπερ καὶ τἄλλα κυροῦται, ἔπειτα λύοντα τοὺς ἐναντίους is 
the meaning of πρῶτον μὲν [...] ἔπειτα. The most obvious meaning – the temporal 
one – cannot be accepted. If we were to interpret the ὀμωμοκότες as nomothetai, the 
temporal sequence of the procedure would be the wrong way round: according to the 
rules discussed at Dem. 24.32-4 (excluding the document) the contradictory laws 
must be repealed before the final decision of the nomothetai, not afterwards.47 And in 
the following paragraph καὶ πρὸ τούτων, which introduces the previous procedural 
steps (posting the bills before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes and having 
them read out in the Assembly), shows that Demosthenes is not following any 
temporal sequence in describing the procedure of nomothesia.48 Kremmydas suggests 
plausibly that πρῶτον μὲν [...] ἔπειτα may refer to the disposition of the provisions 
in the text of the law just read out.49 It is as likely that they may simply reflect the 
logical priority of the two notions in Demosthenes’ argument. Whatever the case, 
                                                
46 Cf. Canevaro (2013a) 94-102 and (2013b) 150-6. 
47 If we were instead to follow the document at Dem. 24.33 (which is however unreliable) the 
contradictory laws would be repealed by the nomothetai and there would be no temporal sequence. 
48 The scholiast is aware of this and comments: ‘πρῶτον’ δὲ οὐ τῇ τάξει, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀξιώματι καὶ τῷ 
κυροῦν (Schol. Dem. 20.93). 
49 Kremmydas (2012) 250-1. He also claims that the order mirrors that of the document at Dem. 24.33, 
but this is a circular argument, as this passage is probably the source of that document. 
 17 
Demosthenes is explicit at §§89 and 96 that contradictory laws must be repealed 
through a public action, and therefore by the judges (the most obvious interpretation 
of ἐν τοῖς ὀμωμοκόσιν). We should therefore consider the possibility that πρῶτον 
μὲν παρ᾽ ὑμῖν, ἐν τοῖς ὀμωμοκόσιν and ἔπειτα λύοντα τοὺς ἐναντίους may not 
describe two separate stages of the procedure, but rather two separate features 
(separately mentioned in the law) of the same procedural step: repealing the 
contradictory laws. This interpretation is confirmed by the wider context of the 
argument, which still reflects the agenda expressed at §89: the public charge against 
Leptines’ law is in accordance with the rules of nomothesia. It is therefore completely 
natural that, after the law is read out by the clerk, Demosthenes would concentrate on 
those particular rules that concern the repealing of contradictory laws and govern the 
very public charge brought against Leptines’ law. 
ἐν τοῖς ὀμωμοκόσιν is qualified by παρ᾽ οἷσπερ καὶ τἄλλα κυροῦται. This 
qualification is not problematic for this interpretation. κυρόω, in the passive and 
middle, means ‘to confirm’, e.g. a marriage (Hdt. 6.130, ἐκεκύρωτο ὁ γάμος 
Κλεισθένεϊ). Andoc. 1.85 uses it with reference to the laws of the city, which are 
already valid but are reviewed and confirmed in 403 after the restoration of 
democracy (ἐδοκιμάσθησαν μὲν οὖν οἱ νόμοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, […] τοὺς δὲ 
κυρωθέντας ἀνέγραψαν εἰς τὴν στοάν).50 This is the meaning of the verb at §93: 
in order to enact a new law one must first bring a charge against existing laws that 
contradict its provisions; these laws are in effect, and the judges in the lawcourt must 
decide whether to confirm or repeal them (and therefore make the enactment of the 
new law by the nomothetai possible). When Demosthenes states that the judges have 
the power to confirm καὶ τἄλλα, he is probably referring to the power to repeal or 
                                                
50 Cf. Canevaro-Harris (2012) 110-13. 
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confirm decrees of the Assembly through a γραφὴ παρανόμων, to which Solon (in 
Demosthenes’ account) adds the power to repeal or confirm existing laws. But even if 
one wants to read more in this expression, a reference to ‘sovereignty’, this is not 
incompatible with the dikastai: the lawcourts in Athens had in fact the role of final 
review of the decisions of both the Assembly and the nomothetai, performing a task 
akin to modern judicial review, and some scholars have argued that the sovereignty 
ultimately rested with them.51 The implications of their powers were not lost on 
ancient commentators, and Arist. Pol. 1274a 4-5 famously stated that Solon was 
criticized by some for κύριον ποιήσαντα τὸ δικαστήριον πάντων (‘making the 
lawcourts sovereign of everything’). 
Demosthenes at §93 is discussing the need to bring a charge against 
contradictory laws as the first step in enacting a new law. The expression ἐν τοῖς 
ὀμωμοκόσιν must refer to the judges, not to the nomothetai. His words right after the 
law is read out do not contradict, but rather confirm the account of §89. And the need 
to repeal contradictory laws in a lawcourt before the judges is confirmed a few 
paragraphs later. At §94 the orator reminds the judges of other procedural steps of 
nomothesia: posting the new bills before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes 
and reading them in each Assembly after the original vote that allowed new proposals 
to be made.52 He then repeats that he, Apsephion and Phormion have followed all 
these rules, while Leptines has not. At §§95-6 the orator has some provisions of 
Leptines’ law read out, and immediately afterwards an existing law that, he claims, 
contradicts them. He therefore points out that according to the rules of nomothesia, 
the same ones that he is following in bringing a charge against Leptines’ law, 
                                                
51 Cf. cf. Pasquino (2010) and Lanni (2010), on judicial review, and e.g. Ostwald (1989); Ober (1989) 
22-3; Hansen (1974), (1991) 150-5, 300-4, Todd (1993) 170, 298-9; Blanshard (2004); Pecorella 
Longo (2004); Cammack (2012) for the debate on the place of sovereignty in Athens. 
52 Cf. Dem. 24.18 and 24-6  with Canevaro (2013b) 143-50. 
 19 
Leptines should have brought a charge against that law before enacting his, and his 
failure to do this makes the existence of this contradictory law evidence against him. 
This passage confirms the account of §§89 and 93: contradictory laws must be 
repealed through a public charge.  
Demosthenes then mentions that according to ‘another law’ if one fails to 
repeal contradictory laws before enacting a new one he can himself be subject to a 
public charge (καὶ ταῦθ᾽ ἑτέρου κελεύοντος νόμου καὶ κατ᾽ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔνοχον 
εἶναι τῇ γραφῇ, ἐὰν ἐναντίος ᾖ τοῖς πρότερον κειμένοις νόμοις). This ἔτερος 
νόμος is not actually a different law, but just a different clause of the law on 
nomothesia, the clause discussed also at Dem. 24.32-4 (excluding the document), 
which authorizes the use of the γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι against those 
that do not follow the correct procedures and rules for legislating.53 The word νόμος 
can in fact be used to mean a law in its entirety as well as specific provisions of a 
law.54  
 
2.3 Provisional conclusion 
 
All the relevant passages of the Against Leptines are consistent in stating that existing 
laws had to be repealed by judges in a lawcourt, and not by the nomothetai, and Dem. 
24.32-4 (excluding the document) does not contradict this. They isolate two different 
purposes for which the γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι could be used, 
prescribed in two different provisions of the law on nomothesia (cf. καὶ ταῦθ᾽ 
ἑτέρου κελεύοντος νόμου). 1) It had to be used to repeal in a lawcourt, before the 
judges, contradictory laws before a new law could be enacted by the nomothetai; 
                                                
53 Cf. Canevaro (2013b) 147-9. 
54 Cf. Hansen (1985) 358. 
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these existing laws were defended by advocates (called syndikoi or synegoroi)55 
elected by the Assembly, as explained at Dem. 24.36 and §146 (this is the use of the 
procedure made by Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes). 2) It could be used, 
after a new law had been enacted or while it was being enacted, against the proposer 
who did not follow the correct procedures or failed to repeal contradictory laws, 
without enacting any new law; if the charge was brought within a year, the proposer 
was personally liable (this is the use of the procedure made by Diodorus in Dem. 24).  
 
3. How was the replacement law enacted? The correct procedure and Leptines’ 
objections 
 
Some scholars have interpreted certain passages in Against Leptines as implying that 
the law proposed by Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes would automatically be 
enacted once the court repealed Leptines’ law. This is impossible because 
Demosthenes at Dem. 24.18-19, 24-32 and 34-35 is adamant that the body that 
enacted new laws were the nomothetai and not the lawcourts. Scholars have therefore 
argued either that Demosthenes is lying and attempting to deceive the judges into 
thinking that they could act as nomothetai or, alternatively, that the use of the public 
action against an expedient law followed at the trial was an ad hoc procedure created 
by the thesmothetai.56 In this section I discuss the relevant statements at §§89 and 99-
100 and show that Demosthenes does not suggest that the judges would automatically 
enact the replacement law by their vote against Leptines’ law. On the contrary, 
Demosthenes reveals that he is well aware that this will have to happen before the 
                                                
55 Cf. Rubinstein (2000) 43-5 for the relationship between these two terms, and Canevaro (2013b) 156 
for their use in the procedure of nomothesia. 
56 Cf. above pp. 000-00 for these interpretations, and for the problems with them. 
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nomothetai. I also show that Leptines’ objections to Apsephion’s use of the public 
action against inexpedient laws have nothing to do with attempts by Apsephion, 
Phormion and Demosthenes to convince the judges that they have the power to enact 
the replacement law. Leptines objects instead to the inclusion (permitted by the 
thesmothetai) of the replacement law in the plaint presented by Apsephion when he 
initiated his action against Leptines’ law.   
 
3.1 Dem. 20.89 
 
The first controversial statement is at §89: Demosthenes states that if one believes that 
one of the existing laws is not good, he must bring a public charge against it and 
propose a new law to replace it. He adds: ὃν ἂν τιθῇ λύων ἐκεῖνον, ὑμᾶς δ᾽ 
ἀκούσαντας ἑλέσθαι τὸν κρείττω. According to most scholars, Demosthenes is 
allegedly claiming that the replacement law will be enacted automatically as a result 
of the repeal of the old law by the judges in court.57 The description of the procedure 
is very compressed, but Demosthenes’ choice of words does not necessarily support 
this interpretation. ὃν ἂν τιθῇ λύων ἐκεῖνον does not necessarily mean that the new 
law was enacted automatically when the old one was repealed. The present participle 
λύων, used predicatively, does not always have a causal sense (the proposer enacts 
his law because the other is repealed, that is, as a result of the repeal of the other law), 
or a temporal sense, which would express contemporaneity (when he repeals the other 
law, he enacts the other law simultaneously).58 The meaning of the participle can also 
be conditional (if he were to repeal the other, on the condition that he repeals the 
                                                
57 E.g. Hansen (1979-80) 89, (1985) 350-1, Kremmydas (2012) 345 
58 The temporal relationship of the present participle with the main verb should also be understood 
from the context, cf. Smyth (1920) no. 1872, 2061. 
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other).59 The use of ἂν with the subjunctive in the relative indicates in fact that the 
enactment of the new law is a possibility, not a certainty, and a prerequisite for its 
enactment is the repeal of the other law. One does not therefore need to interpret 
Demosthenes’ words as describing a one-step procedure, in which the new law is 
enacted at the same time as the old law is repealed. Given what we know about the 
procedures of nomothesia and the general context of the passage, we should interpret 
Demosthenes’ words to mean that the new law may be enacted (at a separate stage of 
the procedure, before the nomothetai) if, and only if, the old one is previously 
repealed. This interpretation fits well with the general argument in this section that 
Apsephion’s decision to bring a public action against inexpedient laws against 
Leptines’ law is the correct way to proceed when attempting to enact a law to replace 
it.  
 The expression ὑμᾶς δ᾽ ἀκούσαντας ἑλέσθαι τὸν κρείττω (‘you then have 
the power to hear them and chose the better one’ [trans. Harris]) does appear to 
describe a one-step procedure in which the judges hear the relevant arguments and 
make a decision between two laws. Here again Demosthenes’ description is very 
compressed, but it is nothing more than a brief summary of the entire procedure of 
nomothesia.60  ‘You’ (ὑμᾶς) does not refer only to the judges, but rather to the  
Athenians in general, who sat in the courts as judges, voted on proposals in the 
Assembly and on laws as nomothetai. 61  Throughout all the various stages of 
nomothesia, the people are made aware of the options before them (in the Assembly, 
                                                
59 Cf. e.g. Ar. Av. 1390 with Smyth (1920) no. 2067 and Aloni (2003) no. 54b. Note the translation of 
Harris (2008) 131: ‘should the former law be abolished.’   
60 Cf. Harris (2008) 49, note 121: ‘Demosthenes here combines two procedures: first, the public action 
against the old law; second, the process of enacting the new law.’  
61 The orators often identify the judges with the demos in general, of which the courts are a 
manifestation. Cf. e.g. Dem. 21.11, 91 with MacDowell (1990) 235, 314, and also Hansen (1981) 520, 
who argues however that this is not evidence that the dikasteria were regarded as a manifestation of the 
demos (cf. against this view Rhodes [1981] 160; Ostwald [1989] 34-5 n. 131). 
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in the courts, by reading proposals placed before the Eponymous Heroes; cf. §94 and 
Dem. 24.25), and ultimately make a decision between the existing laws that 
contradicts the new proposal and the new proposal. This very abbreviated summary of 
the nomothesia procedure does not imply that the procedure Demosthenes claims to 
be following involves only one stage. In this preliminary description of the procedures 
he is following he does not go into too much detail, and his words, if read out of 
context, may create the impression of a faster and simpler procedure than was actually 
the case. But Demosthenes is not lying: a few paragraphs later he has the actual law 
on nomothesia read out, and later still, as we shall see, he states explicitly that the new 
law will be enacted by the nomothetai and not by the judges (§137).  
 
3.2 Dem. 20.98-100  
 
The most extensive discussion of the enactment of the replacement law is found at 
§§98-100. Here Demosthenes not only discusses the enactment of the replacement 
law, but also Leptines’ objection to the way Apsephion is using it at the trial.  Prior to 
this, Demosthenes had discussed the rules about nomothesia and had shown that 
Leptines failed to repeal an opposing law before enacting his own law. Next he has 
the clerk read out the law that he, Apsephion, and Phormion have proposed to show 
that it is better than Leptines’ law. At §98 Demosthenes states that not even Leptines 
will try to deny this, because he cannot prove that his law is better. Instead he will use 
the same arguments he employed at the anakrisis before the magistrate:62 that the 
                                                
62 On the workings of the preliminary hearings recently Faraguna (2009) and Thür (2008), who show 
that these involved cross interrogation by the litigants as well as the introduction of documents that 
were then sealed in an echinos. Only these documents could be used in the lawcourt (pace [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 53.2: SEG 32.329 shows that the this rule applied not only to private cases, but also to public 
ones). Harris (2006) 410-18 also shows that an accuser could withdraw a charge as long as he did so 
formally at the anakrisis. 
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replacement law had been written next to the other to deceive the judges, and that 
Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes in fact do not intend to enact it.  
This discussion shows that the replacement law had already been discussed at 
the anakrisis and had been placed in the echinos as one of the documents to be read 
out in court. It also shows that Leptines had already objected to it at the anakrisis. 
Hansen argues that the thesmothetai innovated in this case, and Leptines was 
contesting the legitimacy of their innovation, which would have brought about the 
enactment of the replacement law when the court voted to repeal Leptines’ law. As 
noted above, there is no reason to think that the thesmothetai could have made such 
an innovation.63 Kremmydas on the other hand argues that ‘at some point during the 
anakrisis the prosecution would have declared their intention of passing their draft 
law in place of Leptines' law and that would probably have created confusion’ and 
that ‘the thesmothetai were probably not competent juristically to disqualify it from 
the documents appended to the written documents of the graphe. It was up to the 
dikastai of the trial to decide the relevance of the appended documents’.64 Kremmydas 
concludes that the fact that the thesmothetai accepted the replacement law is 
irrelevant, and that Leptines was right in objecting to it, because the public action 
against inexpedient laws had nothing to do with the enactment of a replacement law. 
Yet Kremmydas’ reconstruction of what happened at the anakrisis is problematic for 
several reasons: first, what was relevant or not for the verdict was defined by the 
written plaint,65 not by the judges in court, and the judges swore to vote only on the 
                                                
63 Cf. above p. 000-00 n. 000-00. 
64 Kremmydas (2012) 361-2. 
65 The written plaint, called usually engklema in private cases and graphe in public ones, was of key 
importance in Athenian judicial procedure: it recorded the identity of the litigants, the issues which 
were the subject of the action, the laws and procedure according to which the action was brought, and 
the offence or crime contested (which was phrased according to the relevant laws). On the structure 
and importance of the written indictments see the thorough discussion of Harris (2013) 114-36, and 
more briefly Thür (2008) 65-72. The Judicial Oath compelled the judges to base their judgement 
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charges made in the plaint (Aeschin. 1.154: ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ψηφιεῖσθαι ὧν ἂν ἡ 
δίωξις ᾖ).66 Second, the plaint was introduced when the charge was first brought 
before the magistrate, not at the preliminary hearings. What was then Leptines 
objecting to? Demosthenes states clearly that he objected to the παραγεγράφθαι of 
the replacement law (cf. also οἱ θεσμοθέται τοῦτον ὑμῖν παρέγραψαν, §99), which 
seems to refer to the inclusion of the replacement law in the written indictment 
(γραφή). If the the replacement law was included in the written indictment, this 
would have meant that any comparison of its merits with those of Leptines’ law 
would have been considered relevant in court (εἰς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐρεῖν, [Arist.] 
Ath. Pol. 67.1). The inclusion of the replacement law in the written indictment was 
therefore key for Apsephion’s strategy at the trial: if the law had not been included in 
the written indictment, the judges would have had to restrict their decision to an 
evaluation of the merits of Leptines’ law and could not have compared the two laws. 
Had the new law not been included in the plaint, Leptines would have had an easier 
time defending his own law because his opponents could not argue that the judges 
should repeal Leptines’ law because there was a better alternative available. Leptines 
therefore objected to the inclusion of the replacement law in the plaint at the anakrisis 
because he knew that its inclusion would weaken his case when pleading before the 
judges in court. He was not objecting to any innovations made by the thesmothetai in 
the public action against enacting an inexpedient law.   
When Demosthenes at §99 claims that the thesmothetai (at the anakrisis) 
παρέγραψαν the replacement law, what he means is that they did not oppose its 
                                                                                                                                      
exclusively on the issues mentioned in the written indictment, and the parties also swore to keep to the 
point, as defined in the indictment, and not to speak exo tou pragmatos ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 67.1 about 
private cases; the same oath was sworn also in public cases, cf. Rhodes [2004] 137, and in homicide 
cases, cf. Antiph. 5.11; pace Lanni [2006] 75-114, cf. Harris [2009/10] 327-8). These oaths were 
generally respected, cf. Rhodes (2004) and Harris (2013) 126-36. 
66 Cf. also Dem. 45.50 and Aeschin. 1.170 with Harris (2013) 114-36. 
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inclusion (as Leptines asked them to), but rather confirmed it – in this sense they 
‘included’ the replacement law. Demosthenes uses παρέγραψαν as shorthand while 
summarising what happened – the thesmothetai dismissed Leptines’ objections and 
refused to force Apsephion to remove the law from the indictment – at the same time 
giving the impression that the inclusion of the replacement law, because it was so 
legitimate and necessary, had been effected directly by the thesmothetai.67 The reason 
for which the thesmothetai did not agree with Leptines’ objection, and allowed the 
replacement law to stay in the plaint, is expressed by Demosthenes very clearly: this 
was in accordance with the law on nomothesia. Kremmydas nevertheless argues that 
the thesmothetai presumably did not allow the replacement law to stay because this 
was lawful, but simply because ‘the thesmothetai were probably not competent 
juristically to disqualify it from the documents appended to the written documents of 
the graphe’. There is evidence however that the magistrate who received a charge had 
the power to force a change in the plaint in certain circumstances: in Lys. 13 
Dionysius accuses Agoratus of murdering his father and brings an apagoge against 
him. The statute authorizing this procedure however required that the wrongdoer be 
caught ἐπ’αὐτοφόρῳ, that is, in circumstances that made his guilt obvious. 68 
Dionysius did not include this expression in his plaint (possibly to make it easier for 
him to prove his charge), but the Eleven forced him to add the expression to the 
indictment and to follow the language of the relevant statute.69 At Isae. 10.2 we 
likewise learn that the archon compelled the litigant to add in the engklema that his 
mother was the sister of Aristarchus (II), thus allowing the accuser to make a claim on 
                                                
67 This is what happened at Isae. 10.2, where the archon forced the speaker to add to the plaint that his 
mother was Aristarchus (II) sister: ἠνάγκασμαι μὲν οὖν […] τὴν μητέρα τὴν ἐμὴν ἐν τῇ ἀνακρίσει 
Ἀριστάρχου εἶναι ἀδελφὴν προσγράψασθαι. 
68 For the requirement that accusers follow the language of the relevant statute when drawing up the 
plaint see Harris (2013) 118-25.  
69 Cf. Harris (2006) 373-90 for the meaning of this expression. 
 27 
the estate of Aristarchus (I) not as the grandson of Aristarchus (I), as he wished to, but 
as the nephew of Aristarchus (II).70 Magistrates (in the case of the Against Leptines, 
the thesmothetai) had therefore the power to require accusers at the anakrisis to make 
changes to the plaint if this contradicted the provisions of the relevant laws.71 Leptines 
asked them to do exactly this, but they allowed the proposed law to remain in the 
indictment. Demosthenes states that they did this in accordance with the law on 
nomothesia (cf. §99: ὁ παλαιὸς κελεύει νόμος, καθ᾽ ὃν οἱ θεσμοθέται τοῦτον 
ὑμῖν παρέγραψαν). 
On what grounds did Leptines object to the inclusion of the replacement law 
in the plaint? Demosthenes makes this clear: he claimed that had his law been 
repealed, Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes would have not proceeded to enact 
their own law (§98, ἐὰν δ᾽ ὃν αὐτὸς ἔθηκεν λυθῇ, τοῦτον οὐ τεθήσεσθαι). That 
this was the objection is confirmed by the repeated replies to Leptines’ argument in 
the rest of the speech (§§99, 100, 137): Demosthenes promises the judges that he, 
Apsephion and Phormion will enact the replacement law and observes that there are 
laws and procedures against those who deceive the people which Leptines and others 
can use to compel them to carry out their promise. If this was in fact Leptines’ 
objection, it is not surprising that the thesmothetai ignored it. Demosthenes, therefore, 
pace Kremmydas,72 did not reply to Leptines’ argument by arguing that ‘the law-
proposal in question was only brought as part of the evidence of the graphe to 
demonstrate the defects of Leptines' law by contrast to a better law’. The replacement 
law was not only part of the evidence sealed in the echinos; it was directly relevant to 
the issues defined in the plaint. And the thesmothetai did not allow the inclusion of 
                                                
70 Cf. Edwards (2007) 162; Cobetto Ghiggia (2012) 404; Griffith-Williams (2013) 213-14.  
71 Cf. Harris (2013) 182. 
72 Kremmydas (2012) 361-2 confuses the status of the documents in the echinos with that of those in 
the plaint. 
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the replacement law in the indictment because this was an unusual case73 or because 
they were innovating, 74  but simply because the law on nomothesia supported 
Apsephion’s, Phormion’s and Demosthenes’ position. Demosthenes asserts in fact at 
§99 that the thesmothetai accepted the law because of the παλαιὸς νόμος, the law on 
nomothesia. The παλαιὸς νόμος, as we have seen above, prescribed that in order to 
enact a new law one had first to repeal opposing laws through a public action against 
inexpedient laws. So the repeal of Leptines’ law was a normal stage of the procedure 
for enacting the replacement law. This meant that the inclusion of the latter in the 
written indictment was fully justified.75 This must have been what the accusers said at 
the anakrisis and thereby provided the rationale for the thesmothetai’s decision. 
 Demosthenes moves then at §99 to a further argument: Leptines’ objections 
show that even he knows that the replacement law is better than his own. Because he 
cannot make a convincing argument about substance, Leptines concentrates on 
procedure.76 The transition to the next argument is made through a paraleipsis (‘I 
shall leave aside this point’ – ἐάσω), which contains yet another compressed 
description of how the replacment law will be enacted. This passage has given 
scholars the impression that Demosthenes envisages a one-step procedure requiring 
only one vote in which Leptines’ law would be repealed and the new law enacted at 
the same time.77 First of all, one must dispense with the idea that this paraleipsis 
implies that Leptines’ procedural arguments are strong.78 The paraleipsis is here used 
simply as a transition to a further argument, which is strong even if his opponents 
                                                
73 According to Wolff (1970/2) 36, followed by Hansen (1979-80) 89-90, Rhodes (1984) 58 and 
Kremmydas (2012) 342-3, 361-2 and passim, it was midway between a normal nomothesia procedure 
and a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι. 
74 Cf. Calabi-Limentani (1982) and Hansen (1985) 350-1. 
75 Likewise, contradictory laws were included in the plaint for a graphe paranomon against a decree 
(cf. Aeschin. 3.200 with Harris [2013] 121-2). 
76 A similar argument is made by Demosthenes at Dem. 21.26-7. 
77 Cf. e.g. Wolff (1970/2) 28-44; Calabi-Limentani (1981) 360 and Hansen (1979-80) 89-91. 
78 This is how Kremmydas (2012) 363 reads it (cf. also e.g. Wolff [1970/2] 28-44; Calabi-Limentani 
[1981] 360 and Hansen [1979-80] 89-91). 
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dared to attack his previous arguments (ἵνα μὴ περὶ τούτου τις ἀντιλέγῃ μοι refers 
to this possibility). The same strategy is used in this speech at §§116 e 121: after 
showing that the ancestors honoured their benefactors, Demosthenes considers for a 
moment a scenario in which this was not the case, only to show that this would make 
no difference in the present circumstances. This obviously does not mean that the 
argument that the ancestors were principled and honoured their benefactors is weak. 
Demosthenes states in the paraleipsis that introducing a replacement law, like the 
public action against enacting inexpedient laws itself, is an essential part of the 
procedure followed by Apsephion, Phormion and himself, and prescribed by the law 
on nomothesia. Including the replacement law in the plaint was therefore legitimate. 
This argument is not weak, but it can be made shortly because it has been made 
extensively at §§89 and 93-4. 
 The expression τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ψήφῳ τοῦ τούτου νόμου λυθέντος τὸν 
παρεισενεχθέντα κύριον εἶναι σαφῶς ὁ παλαιὸς κελεύει νόμος has been 
interpreted as a clear statement that Demosthenes envisions a one-step procedure 
which will repeal Leptines’ law and enact the replacement law with one vote of the 
judges. In fact this expression needs not be interpreted in this sense. The main verb is 
κελεύει, which does not necessarily mean ‘to order’, but rather ‘to authorize’, ‘to 
provide a procedure for’.79 Therefore the law on nomothesia clearly provides for the 
replacement law to go into effect (τὸν παρεισενεχθέντα κύριον εἶναι) after 
Leptines’ law has been repealed (τοῦ τούτου νόμου λυθέντος) by the vote of the 
judges (τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ψήφῳ). τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ ψήφῳ is linked with the genitive absolute 
τοῦ τούτου νόμου λυθέντος (‘after the law has been repealed by your vote’), not 
                                                
79 Cf. Dem. 29.9 with MacDowell (1989) 257–72, (2009) 46–7; cf. also Harris (2006) 131 for another 
example. See the translation of Harris (2008) 53: ‘the old law […] permits the law substituted in its 
place to be ratified.’ 
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with τὸν παρεισενεχθέντα κύριον εἶναι.80 Therefore the vote of the judges only 
repeals Leptines’ law, which is necessary before the replacement law can be enacted 
(which could otherwise be attacked through a public action against an inexpedient 
law). This passage therefore, like that at §89, does not actually state that the repeal of 
Leptines’ law and the enactment of the new one will happen at the same time and by 
the same vote. It only states that repealing Leptines’ law is a prerequisite for enacting 
the new one. The paraleipsis therefore summarizes in one quick statement the 
argument developed since §89. 
 
3.3 Provisional conclusion 
 
It is clear therefore that neither at §89 nor at §98-99 does Demosthenes state that the 
judges have the power to enact the new law by their vote or that the new law will be 
enacted as a result of the present trial. Nor does he state this at §164, when he asserts 
that if the judges vote as he, Phormion and Apsephion wish, those who deserve their 
prizes will keep them, while the undeserving will lose them and moreover will suffer 
any punishment the judges deem fit, according to the replacement law. In this later 
passage Demosthenes assumes that if Leptines’ law is repealed, the replacement law 
will eventually be enacted, but he does not insinuate that it will be enacted as a result 
of this trial,81 and at §100 he says explicitly that the new law will be enacted in the 
future, and that Apsephion, Phormion and himself will make sure of this. He states: ‘I, 
Phormion, and anyone else he wishes to add, have pledged to enact the law’ (trans. 
Harris). The future infinitive θήσειν τὸν νόμον shows that the enactment of the law 
will take place in the future, at another stage of the procedure. At §137 Demosthenes 
                                                
80 Cf. Harris (2008) 52: ‘once this law has been rescinded by your vote.’ 
81 As stated e.g. by Rhodes (1985) 58. 
 31 
goes so far as to suggest that if Leptines and those elected to defend the law 
(σύνδικοι) are so convinced that some people do not deserve their exemptions or 
have other accusations to make against them, they should aim to bring a charge 
according to the procedure provided by the replacement law, which Demosthenes 
swears Apsephion, Phormion and himself will enact. But if Leptines and the law’s 
defendants are so keen, they should enact it themselves at the first available session of 
the nomothetai! Apart from the joke made at Leptines’ expenses, Demosthenes is well 
aware of the need for the replacement law to be enacted by the nomothetai and 
explicitly recognizes that by repealing Leptines’ law the judges are not enacting the 
new law. There are therefore no grounds for accusing Demosthenes of attempting to 
deceive the judges into believing that they have the power to enact the new law or that 
the procedure followed in this case is an innovation involving one vote on both 
Leptines’ law and the new proposal to replace it. The procedure followed, and 
advocated by Demosthenes, in this case, does not contradict the account of Dem. 
24.18-19, 24-32, 34-35, which makes clear that the correct venue for enacting new 
laws are the nomothetai, and not the lawcourts. 
 
4. Conclusions: the procedures followed in the Against Leptines and their 
implications 
 
The arguments laid out in this article offer a new interpretation of the procedures 
followed and advocated in the case against Leptines brought in 355/4 by Apsephion 
with the active support of Phormion and Demosthenes. This interpretation has the 
advantage of being consistent with the procedures of nomothesia as they can be 
reconstructed from Dem. 24.18-19, 24-32, 34-35 and other sources. It does not posit 
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unlikely procedural innovations effected by the thesmothetai to make sense of alleged 
inconsistencies, nor does it assume that Demosthenes and his allies managed first to 
deceive the thesmothetai and then attempted to deceive the judges into believing that 
a law could be enacted in a lawcourt without the vote of the nomothetai.  
Whatever the charge brought originally by Bathippus against Leptines’ law 
(which was brought within a year and was probably a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον 
θεῖναι akin to that brought by Diodorus against Timocrates in Dem. 24), a new 
charge was brought by Apsephion, Bathippus’ son, against Leptines’ law, because 
Leptines was no longer personally liable after a year (§144). This charge, another 
γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι, was not however a stand-alone accusation (as 
the first one probably was). It was part of the wider procedure of nomothesia that 
would end, if successful, with the enactment of a new law. Leptines does not discuss 
the early stages of this procedure, which are irrelevant for his argument, but we can 
assume, on the basis of the information provided at Dem. 24.18-19, 24-25, that it 
involved a vote in the Assembly opening the floor to proposals of new laws, and 
publicity of the new law before the monument of the Eponymous Heroes and through 
readings in the Assembly (§94). It also required repealing all contradictory laws 
before enacting the new one before the nomothetai (Dem. 24.32-4, excluding the 
document). This is the rationale of the γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι against 
Leptines’ law within the procedure of nomothesia: as Demosthenes repeatedly 
protests, repealing contradictory laws is compulsory when enacting a new one, and 
therefore Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes are simply following the law on 
nomothesia when they try to repeal Leptines’ law. And this is confirmed by the fact 
that Leptines’ law is defended by publicly appointed advocates, in accordance with 
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the provision of the law on nomothesia discussed at Dem. 24.36 (cf. also §146).82 This 
is also why they wrote down the text of the replacement law in the plaint against 
Leptines’ law: the public charge was part of the overall procedure for enacting that 
law. The thesmothetai agreed with Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes that this 
was the correct procedure. They therefore ignored Leptines’ protests that they had no 
intention of enacting the replacement law, and this was nothing more than a ruse to 
repeal Leptines’ law. Demosthenes in response to these accusations promises that 
they will proceed with enacting the new law at the first meeting of the nomothetai, 
and points out that if they did not, there are several ways to force them (§§99-100, 
137). But before they can do this, the judges need to repeal Leptines’ law, as they 
cannot enact a new law without first repealing the contradictory laws. 
This reconstruction of the procedures followed in the public charge against 
Leptines’ law, and of the respective cases of the accusers and of the defendants, is 
therefore consistent with the rest of the evidence about nomothesia, and shows that 
even a talented speaker like Demosthenes could not misrepresent the wording and the 
meaning of Athenian laws and procedures beyond recognition. In the Against 
Leptines, like elsewhere, Demosthenes is quite accurate in reporting the provisions of 
the relevant laws, in particular in sections immediately preceding or following when 
they are read out by the grammateus.83 
The conclusions of this essay have important implications. First, they show 
that one of the functions of the anakrisis was to discuss the plaint and to allow the 
defendant to request modifications or for the officials to make them. This was the case 
with Lys. 13 and Isae. 10.2, and Leptines tried at the anakrisis of the public charge 
                                                
82 In the case against Timocrates however there were no elected syndikoi, because the public charge 
against an inexpedient law had not been brought as part of the nomothesia procedure. 
83 Cf. on the reliability of the accounts of the orators Canevaro (2013a) 27-36. 
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against his law to convince the thesmothetai to remove the replacement law from the 
plaint. Minor modifications of the wording of the plaint might have major 
implications for the strategies at the trial, and could make it remarkably easier for the 
accuser to prove his charges or for the defendant to refute them.84 Second, it provides 
further evidence that the functions of the magistrates in Athens were carefully 
circumscribed, and that they did not have the power to create new procedures or to 
modify old ones.85 
Third, it helps to clarify an important step in the nomothesia procedure as 
reconstructed in Canevaro (2013b). Dem. 24.32-4 (excluding the document) makes 
clear that contradictory laws had to be repealed before a new law could be enacted by 
the nomothetai. Yet because the document at Dem. 24.33 is unreliable, we were left 
with the question of what is the correct venue for repealing contradictory laws in the 
process of enacting a new one. A correct reading of the evidence of Dem. 20 allows 
us to answer this question: contradictory laws had to be repealed through a public 
charge against inexpedient laws. This procedure had therefore two separate purposes: 
it could be used against the proposer of a new law that had not followed the correct 
procedures, or had failed to repeal contradictory laws, without leading to the 
enactment of any new law (this is the use we find in Dem. 24); or it could be used, as 
in Dem. 20, to repeal a contradictory law as part of the procedure for enacting a new 
one. Once the contradictory laws had been repealed with a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ 
ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι, the new law could be enacted before the nomothetai.  
One may wonder what happened after the old law(s) had been repealed by the 
courts through the γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι and before the new law was 
                                                
84 This supplements the account of the anakrisis offered by Thür (2008) and Faraguna (2009), and that 
of the importance of plaint provided by Harris (2013) 114-36. 
85 The Athenians were obsessed with officials’ misconduct, and circumscribed carefully the power of 
the magistrates, in particular when it came to legal procedure, cf. Harris (2013) 117-18 and Thür (2008) 
70-1. 
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enacted by the nomothetai. During this period the Athenians were apparently left 
without any law at all on the matter at stake. And what would happen if the 
nomothetai refused to ratify the new law? In the case of Leptines’ law, this is hardly 
an issue: once Leptines’ law is repealed by the court, the older law confirming grants 
by the demos (§96) – which Leptines did not bother to repeal – stays valid and 
unchallenged. But more generally, even in cases in which there was no law 
beforehand on a given topic, there is no reason for which the Athenians may not have 
decided to leave a particular topic unregulated. This is indeed what happened 
whenever a γραφὴ νόμον μὴ ἐπιτήδειον θεῖναι was brought successfully against 
the proposer of a law within a year from its enactment (as in Dem. 24). The topic of 
that law remained unregulated, unless a new nomothesia procedure was started to 
enact a new law. On the other hand, because once the nomothesia procedure was 
started in the Assembly several laws could be proposed, it was not necessarily the 
case that there would be only one proposal on a given topic. And even if there was 
only one, and the nomothetai chose not to enact it, they may have asked the prytaneis 
to put that topic in the agenda of the next Assembly meeting (or of the next 
nomothetai, as IG II3 355 ll. 39–40 does with changes to the merismos), in order to 
receive new proposals if a need was felt for a particular issue to be better regulated.  
The fourth implication, if this reconstruction is correct, is that the only 
evidence we thought we had about the identity of the nomothetai vanishes. Only two 
passages provided (or seemed to provide) evidence that they were chosen among 
those that had sworn the Judicial Oath. Because the document at Dem. 24.20-3, which 
states exactly this, is unreliable,86 the expression ἐν τοῖς ὀμωμοκόσιν of §93 is the 
only remaining piece of evidence that would indicate that they were chosen among 
                                                
86 Cf. Canevaro (2013a) 94-102 and (2013b) 150-6. 
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the potential judges. Yet I have argued in this article that ἐν τοῖς ὀμωμοκόσιν 
actually refers to the judges that repeal the contradictory laws, not to the nomothetai 
that will enact the new one (pp. 000-00). If this is correct, there is no evidence to 
confirm this widely-held view.87 I plan to come back to this issue and discuss various 
possibilities for the identity of the nomothetai in a separate article. But whoever the 
nomothetai were, whether they were citizens that had sword the Judicial Oath, a 
specific committee, or a session of the Assembly labelled nomothetai, 88  the 
nomothesia procedure was distinctive in setting precise (and extended) times to enact 
a new law, in enforcing a high degree of publicity of new bills, in securing the 
coherence of the laws of the city through the obligation to repeal contradictory laws, 
and in involving various bodies (the Council, a normal Assembly meeting, the 
lawcourts and the nomothetai) in the enactment of new laws. 
The Athenians had in the fourth century not several contradictory nomothesia 
procedures enacted at different times 89  or valid side-by-side, 90  but rather one 
procedure of nomothesia articulated in a series of clear steps, whose purpose was to 
allow legislation while at the same time ensuring that the city’s laws were consistent 
and free of contradictions. The existence of such a procedure does not mean that 
irregularities never occurred, and that contradictory laws were never enacted. The 
very existence of the speeches Against Leptines and Against Timocrates shows that 
sometimes the correct procedures were not followed to the letter, but it also shows 
that when this happened, mechanisms were in place to correct the problem and even 
punish the transgressor. The mention at Aeschin. 3.38-40 of a separate procedure that 
                                                
87 This was attacked with strong arguments by Piérart (2000). Contra Rhodes (2003). 
88 This is Piérart’s suggestion, on the basis of the paradosis of Aeschin. 3.39 (τοὺς δὲ πρυτάνεις 
ποιεῖν ἐκκλησίαν ἐπιγράψαντας νομοθέτας), which he reads as ‘the prytaneis shall hold an 
assembly labelling it nomothetai’. 
89 As argued by MacDowell (1975) and Rhodes (1985). 
90 Cf. Hansen (1985) and recently Wallace (2006) 65-6. 
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tasked the thesmothetai with finding contradictory laws among the existing ones and 
submit them to the nomothetai shows that sometimes laws that contradicted previous 
statutes were in fact enacted. But the aims of these procedures should not be judged 
by their failings. These aims are clear: to provide a system for making new laws while 
at the same time safeguarding the coherence of the laws of the city. As Demosthenes 
states (§93): ‘opposing laws are repealed so that there is one law for each subject. 
This avoids confusion for private individuals, who would be at a disadvantage in 
comparison to people who are familiar with all the laws. The aim is to make points of 
law the same for all to read as well as simple and clear to understand’ (trans. Harris). 
 
Mirko Canevaro 
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